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Understanding the dynamics of inﬂ  uenza transmission 
on international ﬂ   ights is necessary for prioritizing public 
health response to pandemic incursions. A retrospective 
cohort study to ascertain in-ﬂ  ight transmission of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 and inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) was undertaken 
for 2 long-haul ﬂ  ights entering Australia during May 2009. 
Combined results, including survey responses from 319 
(43%) of 738 passengers, showed that 13 (2%) had an 
ILI in ﬂ  ight and an ILI developed in 32 (5%) passengers 
during the ﬁ  rst week post arrival. Passengers were at 3.6% 
increased risk of contracting pandemic (H1N1) 2009 if they 
sat in the same row as or within 2 rows of persons who 
were symptomatic preﬂ  ight. A closer exposed zone (2 seats 
in front, 2 seats behind, and 2 seats either side) increased 
the risk for postﬂ  ight disease to 7.7%. Efﬁ  ciency of contact 
tracing without compromising the effectiveness of the 
public health intervention might be improved by limiting the 
exposed zone.
T
he emergence of pandemic inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 2009 
in Mexico and the United States, with rapid spread to 
Europe, Asia, and the Paciﬁ  c, is testament to the ease of 
spread of infectious disease across the globe (1). The World 
Health Organization activated level 5 pandemic alert on 
April 29, 2009, when sustained community transmission 
of the pandemic virus was demonstrated in Mexico and 
the United States. In her address to the United Nations 
on May 4, 2009, Margaret Chan, Director-General of the 
World Health Organization, called for heightened vigilance 
to limit international spread of the virus (2). Australia’s 
response was rapid, with the introduction of a number of 
measures as outlined in the Australian Health Management 
Plan for Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza, 2008 (3). These measures 
included in-ﬂ  ight messages to incoming passengers, use 
of health declaration cards by all incoming travelers, and 
mandatory reporting by the pilot on the health status of 
crew and passengers before landing (4). The novel virus 
was also listed as a quarantinable disease under Australia’s 
Quarantine Act 1908, which allows for the application of 
public health powers for intervention (5).
Reports documenting spread of disease during 
airline ﬂ  ight are limited (6–9). Speciﬁ  c policy stating that 
passengers sitting in the same row as and within 2 rows 
of a conﬁ  rmed case-patient should be treated as suspected 
of having that disease relies on studies of air travel where 
the index case-patient was infected with Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis  (10–12). The aim of this study was to 
investigate the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection 
from persons with conﬁ  rmed disease on ﬂ  ights to Australia 
during May 2009. The spread of other inﬂ  uenza-like illness 
(ILI) was also documented.
Methods
Study Population
A retrospective cohort study designed to determine 
exposure risk to known pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was 
undertaken for 2 long-haul ﬂ  ights that entered Australia the 
weekend of May 23–24, 2009. Flight 1 was chosen after 
identiﬁ  cation of 6 passengers with conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 infection within 24 hours after ﬂ  ight 
arrival from the United States. Flight 2 was chosen after 
identiﬁ   cation of a conﬁ   rmed case of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009. This ﬂ  ight came from an area that lacked community 
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transmission. Passenger details were obtained through 
collection of Health Declaration Cards and comparing the 
cards to ﬂ  ight manifests obtained from the airlines.
The deﬁ  nition of ILI was broad to capture as many 
persons as possible within the dataset. Passengers were asked 
to self-report development of any of the following signs or 
symptoms: fever, cough, sore throat, headache, runny nose, 
muscle aches, diarrhea, and lethargy. ILI was deﬁ  ned as >1 
symptom (cough, runny nose, sore throat, or fever) within 
7–14 days before the ﬂ  ight or during the ﬂ  ight or <7 days after 
arrival. The time periods were put in place to help determine 
when passengers were most likely to have contracted their 
ILI. Passengers were excluded who indicated bacterial 
infection (antibiotic prescription from medical personnel) or 
regular health issues, such as migraines. All but 4 passengers 
reporting symptoms had conﬁ  rmation of ILI status from a 
qualiﬁ  ed health professional.
Self-identiﬁ   cation of other health conditions that 
were considered potential concurrent conditions for 
purpose of this study included obesity, diabetes mellitus, 
immunosuppression, asthma, chronic lung disease, and 
pregnancy. Seat location, concurrent condition status, and 
contraction of disease were compared. Ethics approval was 
given by the Australian Government Department of Health 
and Ageing Ethics Committee and the Australian National 
University Human Research Ethics Committee.
Data Collection
Surveys were distributed to passengers 3 months 
after ﬂ  ight arrival. The survey asked about inﬂ  uenza-like 
symptoms, symptom onset time, concurrent conditions, 
antiviral prophylaxis and treatment, isolation or quarantine 
dates, other potential exposure to ILI before and after the 
ﬂ  ight, contact with health professionals after the ﬂ  ight, 
and details of testing for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. 
Two reminders were sent to improve the response rate of 
the study.
As a triangulation method, all passenger names, 
passenger sex, disease onset dates, and postal codes 
were cross-checked against those of passengers with 
known pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases that were notiﬁ  ed 
to national authorities for 1 month after ﬂ  ight arrival to 
verify information received from the survey responses and 
identify additional cases. Travel details were veriﬁ  ed for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 case-patients identiﬁ  ed through 
national notiﬁ   cation. Contact tracing through public 
health authorities also identiﬁ  ed ILI case-patients who 
had negative laboratory test results for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus.
Data Analysis
The increased risk of passengers contracting either 
laboratory-conﬁ   rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or an 
ILI (including pandemic [H1N1] 2009) was separately 
estimated by dividing the number of persons with the illness 
by the number of susceptible persons in the contact zones 
as described. For pandemic (H1N1) 2009, only passengers 
sitting in the economy class were considered exposed 
because of the location of persons displaying symptoms 
preﬂ  ight or during the ﬂ  ight and the sectional layout of the 
aircraft.
Results
Of the 738 passengers on the 2 ﬂ  ights, 319 (43%) 
responded to a questionnaire; 143 (18%) of passengers could 
not be contacted. Cross-checking of mandatory notiﬁ  cations 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 against all passengers on both 
ﬂ  ights found 2 additional pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection 
cases while also conﬁ   rming symptom data on survey 
responses. Contact tracing by public health authorities 
found 5 additional passengers with ILI who had negative 
test results for pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
No passengers who had positive test results for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had underlying health conditions 
considered to make them more susceptible to inﬂ  uenza; 
however, 5 of 32 passengers reporting ILI postﬂ  ight had 
>1 potential concurrent conditions (1 each of obesity, 
diabetes mellitus, pregnancy, asthma, and chronic lung 
disease). Limited analysis demonstrated that the concurrent 
condition did not make these persons more susceptible than 
other passengers to contracting an ILI.
Flight 1
Flight 1, an Airbus A380, embarked from Los Angeles 
and arrived in Sydney on May 24, 2009, carrying 445 
passengers. Of the 188 (42%) passengers who responded to 
a survey, 169 (90%) were Australian residents. Response 
rate varied with class of travel, with 11 (79%) of 14 ﬁ  rst 
class passengers, 40 (56%) of 71 business class passengers, 
19 (59%) of 32 premium economy class passengers, and 
117 (36%) of 327 economy class passengers responding.
Combined results from the survey and disease 
notiﬁ   cation data sources identiﬁ   ed 8 passengers who 
had an ILI at the beginning of the 14-hour ﬂ  ight. For 4 
of these passengers, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection 
was later laboratory conﬁ  rmed; for 1, pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection was conﬁ  rmed as negative; 3 passengers 
were not tested. ILI symptoms developed in 2 other 
passengers during the ﬂ  ight, and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
was conﬁ  rmed in both.
Twenty-four passengers were identiﬁ  ed as developing 
ILI symptoms <7 days after arrival in Australia. Of these, 
2 passengers had laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 infection, 15 had illness conﬁ  rmed as negative for the 
pandemic virus, and 7 were not tested. Most passengers 
experienced onset of symptoms <3 days after ﬂ  ight arrival; 
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however, 6 passengers did not state exact date of disease 
onset (Figure 1). 
Self-reporting of symptoms from passengers did 
not distinguish between different causes of ILI (Table). 
Fever was reported from 4 of 8 passengers with conﬁ  rmed 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 7 of 16 passengers whose ILI was 
conﬁ  rmed negative for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and 2 of 
10 passengers with ILI who were not tested. Two or fewer 
symptoms, not including fever, were reported for 3 of the 
8 passengers with conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 7 for 
those testing negative for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and 6 
with ILI who were not tested.
Location and Transmission
Twenty (83%) of 24 passengers in whom an ILI 
developed postﬂ  ight sat in aisle seats (Figure 2). This seat 
location increased the risk of contracting an ILI by 1.8×; 
however, it did not reach statistical signiﬁ  cance. Survey 
respondents were 1.3× more likely to sit in an aisle seat.
Some clustering of cases was seen with the potential 
for spread of either ILI or pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from 
passengers who were infectious before and during the 
ﬂ  ight (Figure 2). The passengers who were symptomatic 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 before the ﬂ  ight  departed 
were traveling as a family group; however, they were not 
connected to the persons who contracted the virus during 
the  ﬂ   ight. Likewise, 2 other clusters of nonpandemic 
ILI with either symptomatic persons boarding the ﬂ  ight 
or showing symptoms postﬂ  ight were in family groups 
and therefore would have had substantial contact before, 
during, and after the ﬂ   ight. Disease was deemed to 
have spread during the ﬂ  ight in passengers from seats 
69H/69J/69K/70H to 68K and 71K, with all case-patients 
having positive test results for pandemic (H1N1) 2009; 
from 63C to 62D (neither passenger being tested); and 
from 84E/84F to 83G, with all case-patients testing 
negative for pandemic (H1N1) 2009. One cluster (seats 
35B/36B/36D/37D) had no identiﬁ  able  preﬂ  ight  index 
case-patient; however, 2 of the passengers were part of a 
family group.
In the cabin section of rows 66–77 was a cluster of 
passengers with symptoms before boarding who were later 
found to have positive test results for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009. ILI symptoms developed in 7 passengers after the 
ﬂ  ight. In 2 of these passengers, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was 
laboratory conﬁ  rmed; for 4, ILI was conﬁ  rmed as negative 
for pandemic (H1N1) 2009; and 1 person (seat 75G) was 
not tested.
Similarly, in the cabin section of rows 50–64, symptoms 
developed in 2 passengers during the ﬂ  ight or on the day of 
arrival (seats 52C and 58B); these passengers were found to 
be pandemic (H1N1) 2009 positive. Symptoms developed 
in 7 passengers after ﬂ  ight arrival; 5 of whom had negative 
test results for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 2 (seats 54F and 
62D) were not tested.
Risk of Contracting Disease and Contact Tracing
We examined the risk of contracting pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 infection postﬂ   ight to all susceptible 
passengers seated in the economy section of the aircraft. 
Health authorities contacted 145 passengers on ﬂ  ight  1 
for quarantine and prophylactic treatment after potential 
exposure to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (Figure 2, large black 
boxes). Of these, 52 (35%) passengers responded to the 
surveys, of whom 8 (15%) went into isolation 1 day after 
ﬂ  ight arrival, 17 (33%) by 2 days after ﬂ  ight arrival, and the 
others >3 days after ﬂ  ight arrival.
Initially, we looked at passengers exposed to this 
disease who sat in the same row as or within 2 rows either 
side of passengers who had symptoms develop before 
or during the ﬂ   ight. The increased risk of contracting 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by sitting in those seats was 1.4% 
(95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] –0.5% to 3.4%). If the contact 
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Figure 1. Onset date of inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) in passengers 
traveling to Australia on ﬂ  ight 1, May 24, 2009. Six other passengers 
did not state exact ILI onset date. White bar indicates a negative 
test result for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus; black indicates a 
positive test result for pandemic (H1N1) 2009; gray bars indicate 
ILI with no test given. 
Table. Signs and symptoms reported by passengers on flight 1 
with influenza-like illness, by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 testing 
status and results, Australia, May 2009* 
Sign or 
symptom 
Tested  Not tested, 
n = 10  Positive, n = 8 Negative, n = 16
Fever 4 7 2
Cough 6 8 3
Sore throat 19 6
Headache 48 3
Runny nose 51 0 5
Muscle aches 36 3
Diarrhea 12 1
Lethargy 57 2
Vomiting 01 0
*Signs and symptoms are not mutually exclusive. Transmission of Inﬂ  uenza on International Flights
zone was modiﬁ  ed to sitting in the same row as or within 2 
rows either side of passengers who had preﬂ  ight symptoms 
(rows 67–72) and not those in whom symptoms developed 
during the ﬂ  ight, the risk of contracting pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 postﬂ   ight increased to 3.6% (95% CI –1.3% to 
8.6%). No passengers were detected as acquiring pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 from either of the passengers with symptoms 
that developed during the ﬂ  ight; however, 2 passengers 
in the same section of the aircraft who responded to the 
survey indicated having had ILI symptoms but not being 
tested for pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
The current zone for contact tracing is deﬁ  ned  by 
passengers in the same row as and within 2 rows either 
side of the index case-patient. A closer zone forming a 
square delimited by 2 seats in front, 2 seats behind, and 
2 seats on either side of the index case-patient could be 
prescribed (Figure 2, small black boxes [rows 67–72]). 
When the risk of contracting pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
postﬂ  ight was calculated for economy passengers sitting in 
the 2 × 2 square around the preﬂ  ight symptomatic index 
case-patients in seats 69H–70H, the risk of becoming ill 
postﬂ  ight increased to 7.7% (95% CI –2.6% to 17.9%).
Flight 2
On May 23, 2009, a Boeing 747-400 arrived in Sydney 
from Singapore carrying 293 passengers. Of the 131 (45%) 
passengers responding to a survey regarding the potential 
for contracting an ILI during their ﬂ  ight, 114 (87%) were 
Australian residents. Public health authorities were not 
alerted to the potential for passengers carrying pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus on this ﬂ  ight until 6 days after arrival. 
They were alerted after mandatory notiﬁ  cation of the virus 
infecting 1 passenger.
Survey data showed that 1 passenger was identiﬁ  ed as 
having symptoms consistent with an ILI before the ﬂ  ight 
and that symptoms developed in 2 additional passengers 
on the ﬂ  ight. The passenger who was symptomatic before 
the ﬂ  ight was not tested for pandemic (H1N1) 2009; of the 
passengers whose symptoms developed during the ﬂ  ight, 1 
was not tested and 1 (adult in seat 33D) was tested 6 days 
after ﬂ  ight arrival. At that time, the test returned a negative 
result.
Six passengers were identiﬁ   ed from the survey as 
having ILI symptoms within 7 days after ﬂ  ight  arrival 
(Figure 3). Of these, 1 passenger with symptom onset 
within 48 hours after ﬂ  ight arrival (a child in seat 33D) was 
laboratory conﬁ  rmed to have pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 1 
passenger (seat 24K) had negative test results for pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza A, and 4 passengers (seats 34A, 35B, 41G, and 
63D) were not tested. The passenger in whom pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 was conﬁ  rmed was a child companion sharing 
a seat on the aircraft with the passenger whose symptoms 
developed during the ﬂ  ight but who tested negative for the 
virus.
Some clustering of cases was seen, with a potential 
spread of disease from passengers who were symptomatic 
during the ﬂ  ight (seats 62C–63D, 33D–34A, and 35B and 
the child sharing 33D). Transmission of disease between 
adult and child in 33D could have occurred before or during 
the ﬂ  ight. With lack of a conﬁ  rmed index case-patient for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, the increased risk for disease 
was not calculated. No other passengers on this ﬂ  ight had 
positive test results for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection 
after triangulation methods with the notiﬁ  able  diseases 
database.
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Figure 2. Passenger 
conﬁ  guration  on  ﬂ  ight 
1 arriving in Sydney, 
New South Wales, 
Australia, on May 24, 
2009. ILI, inﬂ  uenza-
like illness. RESEARCH
Discussion
Of 2 long-haul ﬂ  ights entering Australia within the 
ﬁ  rst month after declaration of a level 5 alert for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, a total of 45 (6%) of 738 passengers on 2 
aircraft were identiﬁ  ed as having the potential to spread 
an ILI into the local community. Follow-up conﬁ  rmed 9 
passengers with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection; 8 of 
these were from ﬂ  ight 1.
Flight 1, originating from a destination with documented 
widespread community transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, had the greatest potential for introducing the 
pandemic virus into the Australian community, with 2% of 
its tested passengers being conﬁ  rmed positive for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. Spread of the virus from a region known to 
have sustained community transmission was to be expected 
and formed part of the case deﬁ  nition in Australia during 
the early phases of the pandemic (13). However, ﬂ  ight 2 
originated in Singapore, where the ﬁ  rst recorded case of 
the disease was on May 26, 2009 (14), 3 days after the 
aircraft arrived in Australia, which suggests that a targeted 
approach to aircraft screening that relies on country-speciﬁ  c 
information is not completely reliable.
Transmission of ILIs on board these aircraft clustered 
closely with a passenger who was symptomatic during 
the ﬂ  ight or may have been in contact with an infectious 
passenger for >15 minutes during the ﬂ  ight. This ﬁ  nding 
is similar to transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
noted on a long-haul ﬂ  ight to New Zealand in 2009 (6). 
Recent studies on the transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in ferrets demonstrated preference for aerosol and 
droplet transmission of the virus (15,16). A similar study 
investigating the disease in a tour group in China indicated 
droplet transmission from coughing or talking with the 
index case-patient as being the main mode of transmission 
(17). The cabin in the A380-800 (ﬂ  ight 1) allows for a 10% 
wider seat in economy class than does the 747-400 (ﬂ  ight 
2) (18), and modern ventilation systems in aircraft circulate 
air around bands of seat rows rather than the through length 
of the aircraft (19). However, neither of these measures are 
enough to prevent droplet transmission from either talking 
(≈1 meter) or spread of smaller aerosol droplets (7,8).
Vigilance by health authorities and cooperation by 
the public assisted in detecting many ILIs that were not 
associated with pandemic (H1N1) 2009. These ILIs could 
be caused by different viruses, as seen by Follin et al. (20). 
Follin et al. reported that, although 5% of the 70 passengers 
examined in their study had pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
rhinovirus, coronavirus, inﬂ   uenza B, and parainﬂ  uenza 
were also detected.
Contact tracing and implementation of public health 
intervention measures after in-ﬂ  ight exposure to disease 
is time and resource intensive (21). Southern Hemisphere 
estimates of the serial interval for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
varied from 1.5 days to 2.9 days (22,23), yet practicalities 
associated with disease diagnosis and contact tracing 
meant that quarantine dates began 1–5 days after ﬂ  ight 
arrival, thus minimizing opportunities to halt transmission 
by social isolation or chemoprophylaxis. Although 
compliance with the current practice of following up all 
passengers in the same row as and within 2 rows either 
side of the index passenger (11) was similar to a recent 
survey from Switzerland of air travelers in Europe (24), the 
increased risk of contracting disease as found in the current 
study would suggest that further limiting of the zone 
required for contacting exposed passengers could assist in 
efﬁ  cient yet effective public health outcomes. Furthermore, 
use of risk assessment of different diseases would enable 
implementation of a public health response that would be 
proportionate to potential disease severity.
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and other ILIs can be spread 
to a community by passengers who were symptomatic 
before boarding the aircraft. Four of 9 of passengers in 
whom pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was diagnosed displayed 
symptoms preﬂ  ight. This ﬁ  nding is similar to that in a 
recent study looking at the travel patterns of patients with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 reported from Singapore, where 
25% of patients had symptoms before boarding their 
ﬂ  ights (14). Modeling predicting the global dynamics of 
disease spread and evidence obtained during the grounding 
of ﬂ  ights in the United States after September 11, 2001, 
demonstrated that travel restrictions can delay the intercity 
spread of inﬂ  uenza (25). Further modeling has shown that 
the intervention by preventing symptomatic passengers 
from boarding ﬂ  ights, particularly at airports considered 
major hubs, assisted in delaying inﬂ  uenza spread by up 
to 2 weeks (26). The control measure of exit screening, 
combined with the potential value of deterring passengers 
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Figure 3. Onset date of inﬂ  uenza-like illness in passengers traveling 
to Australia on ﬂ  ight 2, May 23, 2009. White bar sections indicate 
a negative test result for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus; black bar 
section indicates a positive test result for pandemic (H1N1) 2009; 
gray bar sections indicate ILI with no test given. ILI, inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness.Transmission of Inﬂ  uenza on International Flights
from travel, also efﬁ  ciently restricts the spread of other 
respiratory illnesses (27).
Potential limitations in this study include lack of 
knowledge of the health status of passengers who did 
not return the survey or inform health authorities of ILI 
symptoms after ﬂ   ight arrival, response bias resulting 
from contact with authorities after ﬂ   ight arrival, recall 
bias caused by the length of time between ﬂ  ight arrival 
and survey response; and potential for contracting an ILI 
postarrival from a source other than the ﬂ  ight.  Cross-
checking of data collected by local health authorities at 
the time of ﬂ  ight arrival showed no recall bias. Response 
levels from passengers contacted by health authorities were 
higher than those not contacted, thereby limiting response 
bias. The spectrum of signs and symptoms of passengers 
contracting ILI or pandemic (H1N1) 2009 varies; therefore, 
if a passenger did not return the survey or contact medical 
personnel or health authorities after the ﬂ  ight, some cases 
may have been missed (28). Media coverage of the arrival 
of ﬂ  ight 1 requesting passengers with ILI to contact health 
authorities was substantial. Although many passengers 
may be assumed to have then sought medical advice, the 
number of passengers who were not tested but reported ILI 
symptoms on their survey indicated this assumption was 
incorrect. Contracting pandemic (H1N1) 2009 postﬂ  ight 
from a source in the community was unlikely. There 
was a small chance of contracting the disease preﬂ  ight 
because of community transmission for ﬂ  ight 1; however, 
ﬂ   ight 2 originated from an area with no documented 
community transmission. At the time of investigation, 
community transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was 
not documented at the arrival port. The likelihood of 
community transmission is also low because all passengers 
with conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had symptom onset 
date within 48 hours after ﬂ  ight arrival.
Spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and other ILIs 
occurred in limited zones of the aircraft during international 
ﬂ  ights into Australia during May 2009. The time required 
to contact passengers postﬂ  ight resulted in the potential 
spread of disease into the community despite guidelines and 
policies in place to reduce the risk for disease importation. 
Nonetheless, application of these policies by Australian 
authorities may have assisted in delaying the importation 
of identiﬁ   ed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases during the 
ﬁ  rst month of the recent pandemic. The ﬁ  ndings of this 
investigation suggest that efforts to prevent importation 
of respiratory diseases into a community and protection 
of individuals from in-ﬂ  ight exposure to ILI may require 
changes in international policies of both exit screening 
of symptomatic passengers preﬂ  ight and contact tracing 
of those exposed to an ILI inﬂ  ight. Further research on 
transmission of ILI in aircraft and into the effects of exit 
screening at international airport hubs to restrict travel 
of passengers with symptoms before ﬂ  ying would be of 
particular interest for respiratory disease of greater severity 
than pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
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